The post-soviet period would inevitably lead to a revision of Turkey’s role for the United States, with a tendency of diminishing importance. This circumstance was felt by the Turkish leadership and the ambitious and independent policy of Erdogan who came to power there determined by the expectation of inevitable weakening of Turkey’s role.

The first big signal of this was the Armenian victory in Artsakh which happened under a noticeable geopolitical consensus of at least not hindering and also supporting to some extent. The essential circumstance was the weakness of Russia following the collapse of the USSR.

In the following years, however, on the one hand, the Armenian elite was unable to assess the ongoing setting adequately, and on the other hand, a gradual domestic crystallization started in Russia. The combination of these two significant realities led to the neutralization of Armenia as a subject and revival of the Russian-Turkish Treaty of Moscow which had been violated and annihilated by the Artsakh victory of the Armenians in Artsakh.

The offensive organized by the joint effort of the Moscow establishment, as well as Ankara and Baku, was disrupted by the Armenian army by sovereign will, determined public support. The ruling system in Armenia was then incapable of political capitalization of the situation that had changed essentially due to its nature and moral and physical obsolescence.

The velvet revolution in April 2018 changed the setting, thereby capitalizing the success of the Armenian army in April 2016. In October 2018 John Bolton, a national security advisor to the U.S. president, affirmed with a regional visit that kicked off in Moscow that what happened in Armenia could have a certain degree of reliability. Bolton’s message was the proposal on American weapons which incorporated a wider political metaphoric layer indeed.

At the same time, the new government in Armenia did not question its alliance, partnership with Russia but at the same time put responsibility on Russia for regional security and announced that if Russia doubts Armenia, Armenia has the same right too.

At the end of the day, the new level of the Armenian issue maturing in the U.S. political establishment was the logical affirmation of this setting or the so-called initial “formalization”.

The continuation will depend on how effectively the Armenian elites will bring up the issue of giving up on the Russian-Turkish treaty of Moscow signed at the expense of the blood of Armenians and Armenia as a subject as a platform for its relations with Turkey and regional politics. 2021 is the 100thyear of this treaty, and the sides are facing the next choice.

Either Moscow chooses to prolong the treaty, and it means choosing the way to another war against Armenia, with consequences that will affect Russia first of all, or it chooses to leave the region or opts for the so-called American-Russian agreement, not at the expense of Armenia but based on Armenia. This would be the only reliable platform for the Russian presence and role in the region when instead of neutralizing Armenia as a subject in front of Ankara Moscow will commit to supporting Armenia as a subject and partnership for security, as an important regional role and prospect for retaining the Russian state.

https://www.lragir.am/en/2019/12/16/73858